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There is no affidavit stating that the specific actions of the physician's assistant Jeffery 
J ohnbson, as related by Appellant Heather Hall, were within any standard of care for taking a 
patient's pulse. Mr. Johnson, the physician's assistant, states in his affidavit, "I listened to her 
heartbeat with my stethoscope .... " Affidavit of Jeffery Johnson, P.A., Clerk's Record, p. 21, 
para. 8. Heather Hall had a far more detailed version of what Mr. Johnson actually did when he 
was supposed to be taking her pulse, and there is no affidavit stating that her factual description 
of what happened to her in a Pocatello emergency room in 2009 was within any acceptable 
standard of care for taking a pulse in a Pocatello emergency room in 2009. 
As Respondent does not want this case to be about the medical knowledge required to 
take a patient's pulse, and does not wish to address the sworn allegations of Heather Hall, 
counsel went outside the record of this case and re-characterized what it was that Jeffery Johnson 
was doing when he encountered Heather Hall: 
"As part of the reasonable and necessary evaluation for this patient, Respondent 
Johnson conducted a physical examination which required him to auscultate the 
patient's heart and lungs with his stethoscope. This act, performed in the course 
and scope of providing medical care to evaluate the patient's condition, required 
Respondent Johnson to partially remove the patent's bra and place the stethoscope 
on the patient's chest in order to listen to her internal organs." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9. This explanation should be stricken, as it has no basis in the record 
whatsoever. It is mere argument of counsel unsupported by any fact in the record. 
Appellant's Reply Brief p. 1 
Appellant's Claims Are Governed by Idaho's Medical Malpractice Act 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 9-12) 
Appellant is not urging that her claims are not governed by the Medical Malpractice Act. 
As stated by Appellant in her opening brief, she has complied with the requirements of that act, 
as demonstrated by the Affidavit of Dr. David Bowman. 
The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Concluded Dr. Bowman's 
Affidavit Failed to Comply with the Admissibility Requirements 
of IRCP 56(e) and I.e. Section 6-1013 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 12-22) 
Appellant addressed this in her opening brief, showing how Dr. Bowman's affidavit met 
the requirements of showing that Dr. Bowman was familiar with the standard of care for 
Pocatello emergency rooms in 2009, and showing how he was familiar. 
Counsel was asked who the Pocatello doctor with emergency room privileges was who 
gave David Bowman the standard of care for an emergency room in Pocatello in 2009, and stated 
in court the doctor was Dr. David Wise of Pocatello. Tr., p. 17, 1. 6, to p. 19, 1. 1. It is not true 
that Dr. Wise was not disclosed to defense counsel. As Dr. Bowman was a physician qualified to 
practice in 2009 in emergency rooms down the road in Idaho Falls, it was not difficult for him to 
learn the standard of care for taking a pulse in an emergency room in Pocatello in 2009. 
The fact that is missed by the defense, and frankly by Judge Nye at the urging of the 
defense, is that the defense raises potential cross examination questions for Dr. Bowman and 
speculates, that, had the defense taken his deposition, the defense might have found a flaw in Dr. 
Bowman's credentials. The defense never did take Dr. Bowman's deposition, they never asked 
Appellant's Reply Brief p.2 
to do so, but preferred to pursue a summary judgment motion against this victim by 
misconstruing Dr. Bowman's affidavit and supposing that had they deposed or cross examined 
Dr. Bowman, he might be mistaken in his statements concerning his qualifications. 
The plaintiff is not hiding anything. No matter how much information was contained in 
an affidavit by Dr. Wise, and Plaintiff submits more than sufficient foundation was submitted to 
the court that Dr. Wise did familiarize himself with the standard of care for taking a pulse in a 
Pocatello emergency room in 2009, defense counsel will claim it is not sufficient. 
Counsel for plaintiff submits to the court that Plaintiff has met her burden of producing 
testimony from an expert that defeats summary judgment. 
How many times in an affidavit is a doctor required to state the specific time period is 
2009, and the specific place is Pocatello, Idaho? In every sentence? Does each sentence of an 
affidavit have to state the affiant is talking about Pocatello, Idaho? Does each sentence of an 
affidavit have to state the affiant is talking about 2009? That is what the defense is urging, and 
the point is absurd. The fair reading of the affidavit of Dr. Bowman is that he is talking about a 
standard of care in Pocatello in an emergency room in 2009. 
Again, this case is not about brain surgery. It is about taking a pulse. And we have a 
medical doctor licensed in Idaho discussing whether facts contained in Heather Hall's affidavit 
describing a physician's assistant's actions when he is supposed to be taking a pulse. To the 
extent Respondent's brief addresses cases concerning medical specializations, those cases are 
irrelevant. There is no authority in common sense or in facts or even opinions cited in this case 
that any degree of specialization is required to properly obtain a pulse. 
Further, as to Respondent's arguments in pages 20-21 of his brief, there is nothing in the 
record indicating there is any different standard applied when a physician's assistant takes a 
Appellant's Reply Brief p.3 
pulse compared to when the physician himself takes a pulse. At page 21 of Respondent's brief, 
he states "it was precisely because of these differences that the statutory language was employed 
to insulate health care providers from being held to an unfair standard of practice." There is no 
unfair standard urged by Appellant in this case. This case is about whether or not the P A groped 
Heather Hall. He either did or did not. 
A Statewide Standard Holds Physician Assistants Shall Not 
Abuse or Exploit Patients in Their Care. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-30) 
Since there is a state statute prohibiting abusing or exploiting patients, I.e. Section 54-
1814, and that statute explicitly applies to physicians as well as physician assistants, that statute 
expressly sets forth a statewide standard applicable to every physician and every physician 
assistant in Idaho, whether the person practices in Boise, Pocatello or Glens Ferry. This is not a 
matter of whether an MRI is warranted in a small community which can't afford the same 
equipment as Boise; it is a statewide standard that the physician's assistant shall not abuse or 
exploit a patient. Not in any Idaho city. This standard has nothing to do with whether one 
community can afford state-of-the-art equipment while the neighboring community cannot. 
This standard is about using your position as a doctor or P.A. to abuse or exploit a patient 
in your care. It is not allowed at all in Idaho. 
There is nothing wrong and everything right about holding a physician assistant to this 
standard in an Idaho medical malpractice suit. There is no authority in Idaho holding this cannot 
be done. 
Appellant's Reply Brief p.4 
Where an expert demonstrates that a local standard of care has been replaced by a 
statewide or national standard of care, and further demonstrates that he or she is 
familiar with the statewide or national standard, the foundational requirements of 
I.C. Section 6-1013 have been met. 
Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 116, 254 P .3d 11, 17 (2011). 
At page 23, counsel says Respondent addressed the conduct at issue. That is not true. 
This is a summary judgment motion. The conduct to be addressed is the conduct described by 
the Plaintiff, not the conduct described by the Defendant. No affidavit supplied by the defense 
addresses the propriety of the conduct described by Heather Hall. 
At pages 23-24, Respondent confuses the requirements for an affidavit of a fact witness 
with that required of an expert. Dr. Bowman signed his affidavit prior to Heather Hall signing 
hers, so Dr. Bowman was rendering an opinion on based on the allegations of Heather Hall in her 
complaint; these allegations were repeated in her affidavit filed with the court. There is nothing 
improper about that. 
Respondent's comments regarding Dr. Bowman not pointing out an irregularity in the 
medical records are likewise irrelevant. (Respondent's Brief, p.25). When a physician's assistant 
gropes a patient is it expected that the P A will have documented his sexual misconduct in the 
medical records? There is no requirement that a doctor giving the standard of care point to 
documentation of sexual misconduct in the record before a case may proceed beyond a motion 
for summary judgment. 
Defendant cited several cases in this section of the brief which are inapplicable to the 
issues of this case. 
Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214 (1989), cited by the Respondent, is inapplicable. Strode 
holds that being a board-certified orthopedic surgeon in Chicago, in itself, does not allow that 
Appellant's Reply Brief p.S 
physician to testify as to the standard of care of a board-certified orthopedic surgeon in Boise, 
Idaho. There was no statewide standard of care cited, and no specific rule, as opposed to this 
case. 
Dekker v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 332 (1988), cited by 
Respondent, did not involve any evidence of a statewide standard of care, as in this case. 
Kunz v. Miciak, 118 Idaho 130 (Ct. App. 1990), merely rejected the idea there IS a 
national standard of care for board-certified specialists. There was no statewide standard of care 
based upon conduct which violated a specific rule in place in Idaho, as in this case. 
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164 (2002), cited by 
Appellant in Appellant's opening brief, sets forth a standard for what is required in an affidavit 
of an expert in a medical malpractice case. Appellant's affidavit complied with the requirements 
set forth in Dulaney, as discussed in Appellant's opening brief. It does not address an Idaho 
doctor testifying as to a statewide standard of care regarding conduct as set forth in this case. 
Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890 (2005), cited by Defendant in his brief was a hybrid 
medical malpractice/informed consent case. The case may have been cited by Respondent by 
mistake, as Appellant can see no relevance to an Idaho doctor testifying as to a statewide 
standard of care regarding conduct as set forth in this case. 
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32 (2007), cited by Defendant in his brief at p. 26, is a case in 
which the plaintiff was not claiming a uniform statewide standard of care as to any matter, and 
counsel for appellant in that case admitted such in his oral argument. Ramos concerned whether 
Idaho Falls and Blackfoot can be considered part of the same medical community. 
McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care, 144 Idaho 219 (2007), cited by Respondent in 
his brief at page 26, held that an out-of-state expert was not able to testify that End Stage Renal 
Appellant's Reply Brief p. 6 
Disease treatment was subject to a nationwide standard of care. This was not an Idaho physician 
addressing an Idaho standard of care based upon an Idaho statute. 
Haw v. Idaho Sf. Bd. Of Med, 140 Idaho 152, 158 (2004), cited by Respondent in his 
brief at page 27, was not a medical malpractice case at all. It was an appeal from an 
administrative decision by the Idaho State Board of Medicine sanctioning a doctor's license. 
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 183 (2009), cited by Respondent in his brief at page 
27, concerned whether a delegation of services agreement, a contract between a physician and a 
physician assistant, could be used to establish a standard of care in a medical malpractice case. 
The Court stated it could not. A delegation of services agreement is not for the protection of 
patients, it is merely an agreement setting forth what services a P A will carry out for the doctor 
who employs him. That is in stark contrast to I.C. Section 54-1814, which is designed to protect 
all patients in Idaho from physicians and physician assistants who abuse or exploit them in the 
course of providing care. 
McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, 144 Idaho 219 (2007), cited by 
Respondent in his brief at p. 29, is another case concerning an out-of-state physician testifying 
there is a national standard of care for treating a complex disease, End-Stage Renal Disease 
(ESRD). McDaniel expressly states that an out-of-state expert may testify concerning 
appropriate regulations setting forth a national standard of care in medical malpractice cases. In 
McDaniel, though, the specific regulation cited was a Social Security regulation more concerned 
with organization of a facility and prerequisites for Social Security reimbursement. 
The McDaniels argue that the regulations found in 42 C.F.R. § 405 Subpart U 
create a minimum national standard of care with respect to services provided by 
ESRD dialysis facilities. They further argue the district court's finding, that Dr. 
Wish's testimony regarding the national standard of care was inadmissible, is 
inconsistent with this Court's holding in Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 
Appellant's Reply Brief p. 7 
Idaho 622, 115 P.3d 713 (2005). In Hayward, this Court found that an out-of-
state medical expert could testify as to the standard of care applicable to the 
prescription of pharmaceuticals in nursing homes because certain relevant 
federal regulations created a national standard of care governing 
pharmaceutical use in nursing homes. Id. at 628, 115 P.3d at 719. However, 
unlike the plaintiffs in Hayward, who were able to cite to a specific federal 
regulation that dealt with the administration of pharmaceuticals in the nursing 
horne setting, the McDaniels have failed to cite to any federal regulation that even 
generally deals with the actual physical administration of ESRD dialysis 
. 2 serVIces.-
There is a marked difference between regulations that govern the physical 
administration of health care services to patients and those that govern other 
aspects of a health care provider's practice, such as organizational, 
personnel, and utilization requirements. Hayward does not stand for the 
proposition that a national standard of care is automatically implicated simply 
because the federal government has created some general regulatory scheme for a 
given area of medicine. Where the promulgated regulations do not concern the 
administration of health care services, the principles delineated by this Court in 
Hayward are inapplicable. In such circumstances, Idaho Code § 6-1012 dictates 
that the applicable standard of health care is that practiced in "the community in 
which such care allegedly was or should have been provided." 
Id. at 223. 
McDaniel supports Appellant's position in this case: I.C. Section 54-1814 addresses not 
administrative duties or organizational duties (which were also addressed by the delegation of 
services agreement in Schmechel v. Dille, supra.); it addresses the physical administration of 
health care services to patients: it prohibits exploitation and abuse of patients by P.A.s who are 
treating them. That is the standard in Idaho and it applies statewide to physicians and physician 
assistants alike. 
The Award of Attorney Fees is Not Appropriate In This Case 
This appeal was not pursued frivolously. Appellants request an award of costs. 
Dated this 8th day of August, 2012. 
A 
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